![Politics with Bill Casey [wordmark]](https://billcasey.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/politics_w_bill_casey_fira.png)
Emergency communication failures: do we ever learn?
The catastrophic floods in Kerr County, Texas, once again highlight the cost when emergency communications fail. It seems that we never learn this lesson.
In Kerr County, Texas last week, officials did not use the Integrated Public Alert and Warning Systems (PAWS) available but instead relied on alerts sent only to registered online users. With over 130 confirmed fatalities and 160 still missing, local authorities will now review why they failed to act on urgent National Weather Service warnings.
In Nova Scotia, 2020, during the horrific Portapique shootings, RCMP relied solely on Twitter and Facebook to communicate critical updates throughout the night, no Alert Ready emergency alerts were ever issued. The Truro Police Department was not notified of the presence in their jurisdiction of the shooter and the RCMP declined the Truro offer of assistance. The Amherst Police Department was also not notified of the shooting danger. In the aftermath, the Mass Casualty Commission issued 130 recommendations, 75 targeting RCMP policing and emergency communication issues.
In Ottawa, in 2014, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed the guard at the Ottawa National War Memorial. Then he walked over to the parliamentary grounds carrying a rifle. He hijacked a car and drove up to Centre Block on Parliament Hill. The gunman walked into the parliamentary buildings and opened fire in the Hall of Honour before being killed by security officers.
At the time, the RCMP was responsible for the security of the exterior of Parliament Hill, while the House of Commons and Senate security each handled security for the inside of the building. They all used incompatible radio systems. This fragmented setup meant that even as Zehaf Bibeau entered the grounds with a rifle, there was no integrated alert or coordinated hand-off of information that an armed gunman was heading to parliament, even though exterior security officers knew he was on the way with a rifle. No one even knew to lock the door.
In New York on September 11, 2001, as planes hit the World Trade Center, the EAS (Emergency Alert System) designed to broadcast national warnings via TV and radio, was never activated. Many firefighters had never heard the evacuation orders before the buildings collapsed. An estimated 121 firefighters remained in the North Tower after evacuation orders were issued, largely due to radios that failed to transmit the evacuation orders to the firefighters. Imagine.
Again, the New York Fire Department, the New York Police, the Port Authority Police, and Emergency Measures System used separate, incompatible radio systems, making inter-agency emergency communication nearly impossible.
In New Orleans, during Hurricane Katrina (2005), emergency responders could not call each other, hospitals couldn’t request help, and public agencies were isolated for days. Radio systems used by first responders were incompatible and lacked redundancy. Police, Fire, EMS, National Guard, and FEMA all used different, incompatible radio systems. It was determined that inadequate redundancy and backup made an already devastating natural disaster much worse.
Finally, in Butler, Pennsylvania in 2024, candidate for president Donald Trump was shot and wounded, another man was killed, and two others were injured when a shooter on a nearby roof went unreported to the candidate s substantial security detail. Sightings of the armed suspect on a rooftop with a rifle were not broadcast on shared frequencies as Secret Service and local police operated on different radio channels. Again, a life was lost and others injured due to a sequence of emergency communication failures.
It seems that we never learn.
In my own experience dealing with the RCMP decision to move the Truro 911 Emergency Communication Center to Dartmouth, I came to the conclusion that emergency communications is not a top priority for the RCMP. By any standard, by any guideline, by any Emergency Measures parameters redundancy is a key to emergency communications.
Redundancy just means effective backup equal backup communications, equal backup alternative facilities, backup staffing, backup equipment etc.
By moving the Truro emergency communications facility to Dartmouth, the two largest police emergency communication operations in Nova Scotia are now both in Dartmouth, eliminating that safety measure known as redundancy.
In fact, the RCMP OCC Emergency Communications Center was established in Truro in 2006 after a comprehensive RCMP study of many locations in Nova Scotia, which might provide an effective backup or redundancy location. Truro was determined to be the safest place, and Dartmouth was specifically ruled out precisely because it offered no redundancy. No other community was totally ruled out. But it didn't matter.
Three quotes from the RCMP’s own 2006 comprehensive report on potential locations for an Emergency Communications Center:
It is not recommended that the two largest police communication operations in Nova Scotia be placed within the same metropolitan area. But that is what the RCMP did.
It is not recommended that the RCMP locate their primary Operations Communications Center within the Halifax Regional Municipality. But that is exactly what the RCMP did.
OCC Location Recommendation: The Primary service site should be outside of Halifax Regional Municipality due to risks of placing the two largest police communications centers in close proximity to each other. But the RCMP did exactly that.
Emergency Communications effectiveness was not the top priority when the decision was made to put both of the province's emergency communication centers in Dartmouth.
As for the current status of the RCMP emergency communications system, I am not up to date. However, I do know that the two largest police communications operations in Nova Scotia are now in Dartmouth, contrary to several conclusions and recommendations in the comprehensive RCMP study.
After the six examples of emergency communications failures listed above, I would hope that RCMP and other emergency services would move communications to the top of the priority list going forward. In each of these six examples, lives could have been saved had communication systems been more effective, coordinated, and redundant.
While we cannot always predict natural disasters or acts of violence, we can prepare for them by ensuring robust, redundant, and harmonized communication systems are in place.
Thanks for reading.
Bill
In Kerr County, Texas last week, officials did not use the Integrated Public Alert and Warning Systems (PAWS) available but instead relied on alerts sent only to registered online users. With over 130 confirmed fatalities and 160 still missing, local authorities will now review why they failed to act on urgent National Weather Service warnings.
In Nova Scotia, 2020, during the horrific Portapique shootings, RCMP relied solely on Twitter and Facebook to communicate critical updates throughout the night, no Alert Ready emergency alerts were ever issued. The Truro Police Department was not notified of the presence in their jurisdiction of the shooter and the RCMP declined the Truro offer of assistance. The Amherst Police Department was also not notified of the shooting danger. In the aftermath, the Mass Casualty Commission issued 130 recommendations, 75 targeting RCMP policing and emergency communication issues.
In Ottawa, in 2014, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed the guard at the Ottawa National War Memorial. Then he walked over to the parliamentary grounds carrying a rifle. He hijacked a car and drove up to Centre Block on Parliament Hill. The gunman walked into the parliamentary buildings and opened fire in the Hall of Honour before being killed by security officers.
At the time, the RCMP was responsible for the security of the exterior of Parliament Hill, while the House of Commons and Senate security each handled security for the inside of the building. They all used incompatible radio systems. This fragmented setup meant that even as Zehaf Bibeau entered the grounds with a rifle, there was no integrated alert or coordinated hand-off of information that an armed gunman was heading to parliament, even though exterior security officers knew he was on the way with a rifle. No one even knew to lock the door.
In New York on September 11, 2001, as planes hit the World Trade Center, the EAS (Emergency Alert System) designed to broadcast national warnings via TV and radio, was never activated. Many firefighters had never heard the evacuation orders before the buildings collapsed. An estimated 121 firefighters remained in the North Tower after evacuation orders were issued, largely due to radios that failed to transmit the evacuation orders to the firefighters. Imagine.
Again, the New York Fire Department, the New York Police, the Port Authority Police, and Emergency Measures System used separate, incompatible radio systems, making inter-agency emergency communication nearly impossible.
In New Orleans, during Hurricane Katrina (2005), emergency responders could not call each other, hospitals couldn’t request help, and public agencies were isolated for days. Radio systems used by first responders were incompatible and lacked redundancy. Police, Fire, EMS, National Guard, and FEMA all used different, incompatible radio systems. It was determined that inadequate redundancy and backup made an already devastating natural disaster much worse.
Finally, in Butler, Pennsylvania in 2024, candidate for president Donald Trump was shot and wounded, another man was killed, and two others were injured when a shooter on a nearby roof went unreported to the candidate s substantial security detail. Sightings of the armed suspect on a rooftop with a rifle were not broadcast on shared frequencies as Secret Service and local police operated on different radio channels. Again, a life was lost and others injured due to a sequence of emergency communication failures.
It seems that we never learn.
In my own experience dealing with the RCMP decision to move the Truro 911 Emergency Communication Center to Dartmouth, I came to the conclusion that emergency communications is not a top priority for the RCMP. By any standard, by any guideline, by any Emergency Measures parameters redundancy is a key to emergency communications.
Redundancy just means effective backup equal backup communications, equal backup alternative facilities, backup staffing, backup equipment etc.
By moving the Truro emergency communications facility to Dartmouth, the two largest police emergency communication operations in Nova Scotia are now both in Dartmouth, eliminating that safety measure known as redundancy.
In fact, the RCMP OCC Emergency Communications Center was established in Truro in 2006 after a comprehensive RCMP study of many locations in Nova Scotia, which might provide an effective backup or redundancy location. Truro was determined to be the safest place, and Dartmouth was specifically ruled out precisely because it offered no redundancy. No other community was totally ruled out. But it didn't matter.
Three quotes from the RCMP’s own 2006 comprehensive report on potential locations for an Emergency Communications Center:
It is not recommended that the two largest police communication operations in Nova Scotia be placed within the same metropolitan area. But that is what the RCMP did.
It is not recommended that the RCMP locate their primary Operations Communications Center within the Halifax Regional Municipality. But that is exactly what the RCMP did.
OCC Location Recommendation: The Primary service site should be outside of Halifax Regional Municipality due to risks of placing the two largest police communications centers in close proximity to each other. But the RCMP did exactly that.
Emergency Communications effectiveness was not the top priority when the decision was made to put both of the province's emergency communication centers in Dartmouth.
As for the current status of the RCMP emergency communications system, I am not up to date. However, I do know that the two largest police communications operations in Nova Scotia are now in Dartmouth, contrary to several conclusions and recommendations in the comprehensive RCMP study.
After the six examples of emergency communications failures listed above, I would hope that RCMP and other emergency services would move communications to the top of the priority list going forward. In each of these six examples, lives could have been saved had communication systems been more effective, coordinated, and redundant.
While we cannot always predict natural disasters or acts of violence, we can prepare for them by ensuring robust, redundant, and harmonized communication systems are in place.
Thanks for reading.
Bill